

**The George Washington University
Elliott School of International Affairs**

IAFF 6186: Russia and International Security, Spring 2018

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Course Description

Russia has returned from a period of isolation after the Cold War to become a more powerful geostrategic actor in the current world order. Moscow survived the chaotic period in the 1990s when the Russian military demobilized millions of security personnel and defense spending dropped to only \$14 billion in 1994 after a \$246 billion budget in 1988.

After a dramatic loss of prestige and costly interventions in Chechnya, it was not clear if Russia's military could return with adequate power projection, modern capabilities, and battlefield successes in the 21st Century. How did Russia go from a five-day military campaign in Georgia in 2008, in which their soldiers had obsolete weapons and their officers had to use civilian cell phones, to conduct a highly-technological hybrid war against Ukraine just six years later? How was it able to operate successfully in Syria by air, sea, and land, and help shape events in the Middle East – a region it had little influence in after the Cold War? Vladimir Putin's political leadership has the goal of Russia becoming a great power after enduring the catastrophe of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

A massive transformation has taken place with military modernization efforts that boast an investment of \$700 billion by 2020. Meanwhile, Russia's "hybrid warfare" has become one of the most effective military strategies in recent history. Russia's blend of offensive cyber intrusions, information warfare, covert actions, special operations forces, and traditional Soviet-era combat tactics has the world on its heels.

This seminar will teach students how Russia's security apparatus executes disinformation campaigns, political sabotage, election disruption, government subterfuge, artificial intelligence "bots" in social media, computational propaganda, and new technologies to dominate conventional battlefields. Other topics include: Pre-Soviet and Soviet military history; Russian foreign policy and grand strategy; NATO enlargement; the Ukraine/Crimean crisis and aftermath; energy security; cyber warfare and espionage; status of new Russian defense systems and military capabilities; post-Soviet States' security and Eurasian conflicts; nuclear strategy, arms control, and missile defense; and whether the U.S, Russia, and China are enemies, allies, or rivals.

However, it is important not to overstate the strength of these modern offensive capabilities. The Russian military and the state itself still has numerous weaknesses and flaws, and there is a tendency, as political scientist Daniel Treisman has written, to “focus on the country’s dark side.” Klemens von Metternich once said, “Russia is never as strong as we fear and never as weak as we hope.”

Course Objectives

- Mastering oral presentation skills for verbal analysis of Russian and Eurasian International Security issues. Each student is required to make a positive contribution to every class. This includes responding to the reading assignments by articulating analytical viewpoints and critiques. Students will also be assigned a group presentation to develop peer collaboration, oral delivery, briefing, and public speaking abilities.
- Sharpening concise writing skills on security topics pertaining to the security of Russia and former-Soviet Union states. Writing in a professional policy environment is a critical skill regularly sought from Elliott School graduates. Each student is required to write academic papers that showcase effective written communication.
- Improving research and analysis on Russian International Security. Writing analytical content for a wider academic audience is a somewhat different skill and a major asset for graduating students. Each student will conduct research and compose analyses, and receive two rounds of professor feedback for medium and long-form essays on Russia and Eurasian security topics expected by practitioners of the field.

Course Requirements and Grade Computation

Class Participation (20%)

Class participation is not just attendance; it is about what you contribute and how you respond to the week’s readings. Participation is not just about how much you speak, but about the quality of the contributions and how your words help move the discussion forward. Thus, asking a good question is of equal value to bringing some new information to our collective attention. I keep a written record of each time you contribute to the discussion and I notate the quality of your comments or questions. To calculate your final participation grade, I will aggregate and average your score for each session.

Midterm Paper (20%)

The Midterm paper should not be **less than eight, nor more than ten pages in length**, (excluding the works cited or bibliography). It should be well-edited, double-spaced and 12-point-type in Times New Roman. You will receive an assignment sheet that will have more details on this assignment. The substance of the paper should show evidence that you have read the required book chapters and relevant articles. Grading will be based on the rubrics in the appendix of the syllabus. The paper must be submitted to me at the beginning of class on **March 20**. Please do not email your paper to me; bring it to class.

Group Oral Presentation (20%)

Students will be working in groups to present a panel discussion on a country besides Russia and its security issues. **Oral presentations will be held April 17**. There will be four groups of five students. Presentations will be time-limited to 20 to 25 minutes excluding audience questions.

The format for your presentations will be based on an acronym known as “DIME-P.” This stands for Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economics and Politics. DIME-P is used by many international security professionals and members of the military to analyze, critique, question, and formulate strategy and foreign policy. Groups will select a former Soviet Union state in the Baltics, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, or Central Asia. Group members will then choose a single dimension of DIME-P for their presentation. Grades will be based on the presentation rubrics in the appendix.

Final Research Paper (40%)

The final paper is a research paper on a topic of your choice relating to an aspect or theme of the course. **It is due to me on Monday, May 7.** Please deliver it to me in person at Elliott 303 and do not email it. The topic will be approved by me beforehand. The paper should answer a research question and should involve you making critical analysis. It should also include some policy prescriptions and recommendations depending on your topic. Your paper should reflect on more extensive reading than what is expected in preparation for the seminars. There is a style guide at the end of the syllabus that will help you find a good research question. The final paper **should not be less than 14 or more than 16 pages** (excluding works cited and bibliography). It should be well-edited, double-spaced and 12-point typed in Times New Roman. The substance of the paper should show evidence that you have read the required book chapters and relevant articles.

Students will submit a written proposal with your topic, research question and short outline (one to two pages) to me at the beginning of class on **March 27**. I will then email you my approval plus comments and questions so you can begin work.

Course Policies

Attendance

This course only meets once per week for 14 weeks so attendance at all seminars is mandatory for all students. The only exception is for a religious holiday (with prior notice), a documented medical emergency, or documented death of a close family member. **An excused or unexcused absence will require you to submit a five-page overview of the readings for that session due within seven days of the missed class.**

Deadlines

Late papers will be penalized one-third of the grade per day (from A to A-, from A- to B+, etc.). Incompletes will not be allowed, except in the case of truly dire emergencies. Do not email me papers.

Plagiarism and Academic Integrity

According to the university’s Code of Academic Integrity, “Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one’s own work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate authorization, and the fabrication of information.” For the rest of the code, see <http://studentconduct.gwu.edu/code-academic-integrity>. In general, I expect that you will not lie, cheat, steal, or otherwise conduct yourselves dishonorably. I also expect that you will report to me if you observe others engaging in such conduct. All work you submit for this course must be your own. I will not tolerate any form of academic dishonesty. Suspected cases will be referred to the Office of Academic Integrity.

In-class Behavior

Please exhibit a professional demeanor and always show respect for your classmates during our sessions. Do not use foul language or engage in other types of disruptions. Laptop and notebook users should aim for only a minimal amount of Internet usage during class. However, use of software tools such as Evernote and OneNote are encouraged. Project management applications can also help you with meeting deadlines in graduate school.

Getting Help and Counseling

The University Counseling Center offers 24/7 assistance for students' personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include crisis and emergency mental health consultations, confidential assessment, counseling services (individual and small group), and referrals (see <http://counselingcenter.gwu.edu/access-counseling-services>).

Emergency Preparedness Information

- Sign up for GW alerts through text and on your desktop computer: go to https://www.gwu.edu/~gwalert/pages/03_emergency_communications/ or call the GW Information Line at 202-994-5050.
- Download "GW PAL." This is a campus-wide mobile personal safety location application available on iOS or Android smartphones.
- Call GW Police Department at (202) 994-6111. If the line is unavailable dial 911.
- Option #1 Shelter in Place. Your first reaction in an emergency should be to stay where you are. Evacuate only if you hear the fire alarm or someone instructs you to evacuate. Shelter in place in an interior room, above ground level, and with the fewest windows.
- Option #2 Evacuation. We will always evacuate if the fire alarm sounds or the building becomes unsafe. Do not use the elevator.

Disability

Any student who may need an accommodation based on the potential impact of a disability should contact the Disability Support Services office at (202) 994-8250 in the Marvin Center, Suite 242, to establish eligibility and to coordinate reasonable accommodations. For additional information please refer to: <http://disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/>.

Amount of Time Required for the Course

Graduate Students are expected to spend 120 minutes of direct or guided interaction in class each course session and 180 minutes of independent learning (homework) each week.

Readings

Readings will either be available on Blackboard E-Reserves or on the Gelman Library web site's "ArticlesPlus." Each reading on the syllabus will be labeled with "Blackboard" or "Gelman."

All academic journal articles are available online in databases accessible through the George Washington University Gelman Library. From the library website (<http://www.library.gwu.edu/>) you have two options:

1. Click the "ArticlesPlus" tab and simply type the article title and author last name. It often helps to put the exact article title in quotation marks.
2. Click the "Journals" tab, search for the desired journal title, and navigate to the correct volume and issue for the specific article in question.

Be sure to try both options if any troubles arise. If you are accessing the library website from off campus, you will need to enter your last name and your GWID to obtain access.

For some sessions, readings are from think tank reports, book sections, and chapters, along with a few articles. **These will be scanned and uploaded to the course Blackboard website under “Electronic Reserves.”**

As an international security professional, you are expected to keep current by reading daily analyses of Russia and Eurasia events. Potential sources of this content will be discussed on the first day of class.

Course Schedule

Session One: Tuesday, January 16

Pre-Soviet and Soviet Military History

Figes, Orlando. 2010. *The Crimean War*. Chapter 8: “Sevastopol in the Autumn.” New York: Picador, pp. 230-277. (Blackboard)

Connaughton, Richard. 2003. *Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia’s War with Japan*. Chapter 14: “Tsushima.” London: Cassell, pp. 325-340. (Blackboard)

Pipes, Richard. 1990. *The Russian Revolution*. Chapter 6: “Russia at War.” New York: Vintage Books, pp. 195-232. (Blackboard)

Weinberg, Gerhard L. 2005. *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. Chapter 5: “The Eastern Front and a Changing War, June to December 1941.” New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 264-299. (Blackboard)

Reed, Thomas C. 2004. *At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War*. Chapter 3: “The Paparazzi Pilots.” New York: Presidio Press, pp. 35-60. (Blackboard)

Grau, Lester W. and Michael A. Gress: editors and translators. 2002. Translated from the Soviet Army General Staff. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. Chapter 1: “Phases and Course of the Conflict.” Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, pp. 15-34. (Blackboard)

Session Two: Tuesday, January 23

Russia Grand Strategy and Foreign Policy

Monaghan, Andrew. 2013. “Putin’s Russia: Shaping a ‘Grand Strategy?’” *International Affairs*. Vol. 89: No. 5, pp. 1221-1236. (Gelman)

Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2011. “Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand Strategy.” *Problems of Post-Communism*. Vol. 58: Vol. 2, pp. 28-44. (Gelman)

Kaplan, Robert D. 2012. *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*. Chapter 10: “Russia and the Independent Heartland.” New York: Random House, pp. 154-187. (Blackboard)

Hill, Fiona. 2015. *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations*. Chapter 3: “How Vladimir Putin’s World View Shapes Russian Foreign Policy.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Blackboard)

Kaczmarek, Marcin. 2014. "Domestic Power Relations and Russia's Foreign Policy." *Demokratizatsiya, Washington*. Vol. 22: No. 3, pp. 383-409. (Gelman)

Khudoley, Konstantin K. 2016. "Russia's Foreign Policy Amid Current International Tensions." *Teorija in Praksa; Ljubljana*. Vol. 53: No. 2, pp. 388-408. (Gelman)

Session Three: Tuesday, January 30

Threat of NATO Enlargement and the Promise of Other International Organizations

Joseph, Edward P. 2014. "NATO Expansion: The Source of Russia's Anger?" *The National Interest*. May 1, 2014: pp. 1-3. (Blackboard)

Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2013. "The Russia-NATO Mistrust: Ethnophobia and the Double Expansion to Contain the 'Russian Bear.'" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. Vol. 46: No. 1, pp 179-188. (Gelman)

Sokolsky, Richard. 2017. "The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. March 13, 2017: pp. 1-16. (Blackboard)

Naarajarvi, Teemu. 2012. "China, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Blessing or Curse for New Regionalism in Central Asia?" *Asia Europe Journal*. Vol. 10: No. 2-3, pp. 113-126. (Gelman)

Roberts, Sean P. and Arkady Moshes. 2016. "The Eurasian Economic Union: A Case of Reproductive Integration?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*. Vol. 32: No. 6, pp. 542-565. (Gelman)

Session Four: Tuesday, February 6

Russian Military Intervention – Chechnya, Georgia, Syria

Glyn Williams, Brian. 2004. "From 'Secessionist Rebels' to 'Al-Qaeda Shock Brigades': Assessing Russia's Efforts to Extend the Post-September 11th War on Terror to Chechnya." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. Vol. 24: No. 1, pp. 197-209. (Gelman)

March, Luke. 2011. "Is Nationalism Rising in Russian Foreign Policy?" *Demokratizatsiya, Washington*. Vol. 19: No. 3, pp. 187-207. (Gelman)

Allison, Roy. 2008. "Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace.'" *International Affairs*. Vol. 84: No. 6, pp. 1145-1171. (Gelman)

Ellison, Brian J. 2011. "Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War." *Demokratizatsiya*. Vol. 19: No. 4, pp. 343-366. (Gelman)

Baev, Pavel K. 2017. "Pressure Points: The Syrian Intervention as an Instrument of Russia's EU Policy." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 470, April 2017. (Blackboard)

Charap, Samuel. 2013. "Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention." *Survival*. Vol. 55: No. 1, pp. 35-41. (Gelman)

Session Five: Tuesday, February 13

Status of Current Russian Defense Systems, Military Capabilities, and Technology

Hand Out Midterm Paper Assignment Sheet

Gorenburg, Dmitry. 2017. "Russia's Military Modernization Plans: 2018-2027." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 495, November 2017. (Blackboard)

Baev, Pavel K. 2017. "Russia Celebrates Its Newly Revived Old-Fashioned Militarism." *Eurasia Daily Monitor*. Vol. 14: No. 61, pp. 1-5. (Blackboard)

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2017. "Core Russia Military Capabilities: Nuclear Forces and Weapons." *Russia Military Power 2017*. June 28, 2017, pp. 29-45. (Blackboard)

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2017. "Outlook: A Modernizing Force." *Russia Military Power 2017*. June 28, 2017, pp. 46-65. (Blackboard)

Giles, Keir. 2017. "Assessing Russia's Reorganized and Rearmed Military." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. May 3, 2017, pp. 1-12. (Blackboard)

Morgan, Wesley. 2017. "U.S. Army Unprepared to Deal with Russia in Europe." *Politico*. September 2, 2017. (Blackboard)

Osborn, Kris. 2017. "Russia vs. NATO: Who Would Win in a War?" *The National Interest*. September 5, 2017, pp. 1-6. (Blackboard)

Session Six: Tuesday, February 20

Information Warfare, Disinformation, and Computational Propaganda

Zhukov, Yuri M. 2017. "Warfare in a Post-Truth World." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 471: April 2017, pp. 1-5. (Blackboard)

Kramer, Mark. 2017. "The Soviet Roots of Meddling in U.S. Politics." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 452, January 2017, pp. 1-5. (Blackboard)

Woolley, Samuel C. 2017. "Computational Propaganda and Political Bots: An Overview." Shawn Powers and Markos Kounalakis eds. *Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet: Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation?* May 2017, pp. 13-17. (Blackboard)

Chessen, Matt. 2017. "Understanding the Psychology Behind Computational Propaganda." Shawn Powers and Markos Kounalakis eds. *Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet: Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation?* May 2017, pp. 19-23. (Blackboard)

Sanovich, Sergey. 2017. "Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins of Digital Misinformation." *University of Oxford: Computational Propaganda Research Project*. March 2017, pp. 2-16. (Blackboard)

Hulcoop, Adam and John Scott-Railton, et al. 2017. "Tainted Leaks: Disinformation and Phishing with a Russian Nexus." *The Citizen Lab: University of Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs*. June 20, 2017, pp. 1-29. (Blackboard)

Session Seven: Tuesday, February 27

Cyber Warfare and Espionage

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2017. "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." *ODNI Intelligence Community Assessment*. January 6, 2017, pp. 1-12. (Blackboard)

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2017. "Cyber." *Russia Military Power 2017*. June 28, 2017, pp. 37-65. (Blackboard)

Cole, Matthew and Richard Esposito et al. 2017. "Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days Before 2016 Election." *The Intercept*. June 5, 2017, pp. 1-18. (Blackboard)

Herzog, Stephen. 2011. "Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses." *Journal of Strategic Security*. Vol. 4: No. 2, pp. 49-56. (Gelman)

Jones, Sam. 2017. "Russia Mobilizes an Elite Band of Cyber Warriors." *Financial Times*. February 23, 2017, pp. 1-7. (Blackboard)

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. "Putin's Hydra: Inside Russia's Intelligence Services." *European Council on Foreign Relations*. May 11, 2016 (Blackboard)

Session Eight: Tuesday, March 6

Hybrid Warfare/ Gerasimov Doctrine/ Special Operations

Gerasimov, Valery. 2016. "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations." *Military Review*. Translation originally published in *Military-Industrial Kurier* in February 2013. *Military Review*: January-February 2016: pp. 23-29. (Blackboard)

Kramer, Franklin D. and Lauren M. Speranza. 2017. "Meeting the Russian Hybrid Challenge: A Comprehensive Strategic Framework." *Atlantic Council Brent Scowcroft Center of International Security*. May 2017, pp. 1-29. (Blackboard)

Bugajski, Janusz and Margarita Assenova. 2016. "Introduction: Arsenal of Subversion." *Eurasian Disunion: Russia's Vulnerable Flanks*. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, pp. 17-44. (Google).

Wither, James K. 2016. "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare." *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*. Vol. 15: No. 2, pp. 73-87. (Gelman)

Bachmann, Sascha Dov and Hakan Gunneriusson. 2015. "Russia's Hybrid Warfare in the East: The Integral Nature of the Information Sphere." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 16: No. 2, pp. 198-211. (Gelman)

Bukkvoll, Tor. 2016. "Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas." *Parameters*. Vol. 46: No. 2, pp. 14-21. (Gelman)

Spring Break: No Class on Tuesday, March 13

Session Nine: Tuesday, March 20

Ukraine/ Crimean Crisis and Aftermath

Midterm Paper Due in Class

Haran, Olexiy and Mariia Zolkina. 2017. "The Demise of Ukraine's 'Eurasian Vector' and the Rise of Pro-NATO Sentiment." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 458. February 2017, pp. 1-7. (Blackboard)

Bebler, Anton. 2015. "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*. Vol. 15: No. 1, pp 35-54. (Gelman)

Bercean, Ioana-Nelia. 2016. "Ukraine: Russia's New Art of War." *Online Journal Modeling the New Europe*. Issue No. 21: December 2016, pp. 155-174. (Gelman)

Petrov, Nikolai. 2016. "Crimea: Transforming the Ukrainian Peninsula into a Russian Island." *Russian Politics and Law*. Vol. 54: No. 1, pp. 74-95. (Gelman)

Trenin, Dmitri. 2014. "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry." *Carnegie Moscow Center*. "The Implications of the Ukraine Crisis." July 2014, pp. 15-26. (Blackboard)

Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 93: pp. 77-89. (Gelman)

Session Ten: Tuesday, March 27

Former Soviet State's Security and Eurasian Conflicts

Final Paper Topic, Research Question and Outline Due in Class

Hand Out Oral Presentation Assignment Sheet; Form Group and Pick Presentation Topics

Markedonov, Sergey. 2017. "Why Tensions in the South Caucasus Remain Unresolved." PONARS Eurasia. Policy Memo Number 465. March 2017, pp. 1-5. (Blackboard)

Klinke, Ian. 2008. "Geopolitical Narratives on Belarus in Contemporary Russia." *Perspectives*. Vol. 16: No. 1, pp. 109-125. (Gelman)

Giragosian, Richard. 2006. "Redefining Armenian National Security." *Demokratizatsiya*. Vol. 14: No. 2, pp. 223-233. (Gelman)

Laruelle, Marlene. 2008. "Russia's Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nationalism." *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program*. April 2008, pp. 6-28. (Blackboard)

Olcott, Martha Brill. 2010. "Rivalry and Competition in Central Asia." *Eurasia Emerging Markets Forum*. January 23, 2010. (Blackboard)

Bugajski, Janusz and Margarita Assenova. 2016. "Chapter 2 Northern Flank: Baltic and Nordic." *Eurasian Disunion: Russia's Vulnerable Flanks*. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, pp. 66-99. (Blackboard).

Session Eleven: Tuesday, April 3

Energy Security, New Natural Resources from a Changing Climate, and Arctic Strategy

Group Work: Oral Presentation

U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2016. "Country Analysis Brief: Russia." *U.S. EIA*. October 25, 2016: pp. 1-27. (Blackboard)

Ericson, Richard E. 2013. "Eurasian Natural Gas: Significance and Recent Developments." *Eurasian Geography and Economics*. Vol. 53: No. 5, pp. 615-648. (Gelman)

Stegan, Karen Smith. 2011. "Deconstructing the 'Energy Weapon': Russia's Threat to Europe as a Case Study." *Energy Policy*. Vol. 39: No. 10, pp. 6505-6513. (Gelman)

Wishnick, Elizabeth. 2017. "Tensions with Russia Heat Up the Melting Arctic." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 464, March 2017, pp. 1-5. (Blackboard)

Buckholz, Quentin. 2016. "Russia and Climate Change: A Looming Threat." *The Diplomat*. February 4, 2016. (Blackboard)

Session Twelve: Tuesday, April 10
Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and Missile Defense

Group Work: Oral Presentation

Browne, Des and Wolfgang Ischinger, et al. 2016. "Rising Nuclear Dangers: Steps to Reduce Risks in the Euro-Atlantic Region." *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. December 2016, pp. 1-8. (Blackboard)

Cimbala, Stephen J. 2015. "Nuclear Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for Russia and the United States." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*. Vol. 28: No. 1, pp. 48-71. (Gelman)

Durkalec, Jacek and Matthew Kroenig. 2016. "NATO's Nuclear Deterrence: Closing Credibility Gaps." *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*. Vol. 25: No. 1, pp. 37-50. (Gelman)

Zyzsk, Katarzyna. 2017. "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Evolving Military Doctrine." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Vol. 73: No. 5, pp. 322-327. (Gelman)

Sinovets, Polina. 2017. "The European Missile Defense System and Russia." *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo Number 457, February 2017, pp. 1-5. (Blackboard)

Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2012. "The Politics of US Missile Defense Cooperation with Europe and Russia." *International Affairs*. Vol. 88: No. 2, pp. 329-347. (Gelman)

Session Thirteen: Tuesday, April 17
Oral Presentations Are Given

Session Fourteen: Tuesday, April 24
U.S., Russia, and China: Enemies, Rivals, or Allies?

Suslov, Dmitry. 2016. "U.S.-Russia Confrontation and a New Global Balance." *Strategic Analysis*. Vol. 40: No. 6, pp. 547-560. (Gelman)

Wright, Thomas. 2015. "China and Russia vs. America: Great Power Revisionism Is Back." *Brookings Institution*. April 27, 2015, pp. 1-6. (Blackboard)

Lukin, Alexander. 2016. "Russia's Pivot to Asia: Myth or Reality?" *Strategic Analysis*. Vol. 40: No. 6, pp. 573-589. (Gelman)

Kuznetsova, Ekaterina and Vladislav Inozemtsev. 2013. "Russia's Pacific Destiny." *The American Interest*. Vol. 9: No. 2, pp. 1-9. (Blackboard)

Wishnick, Elizabeth. 2017. "Are China and Russia Teaming Up in Southern Europe?" *PONARS Eurasia*. Policy Memo No. 479, June 17, pp 1-6. (Blackboard)

Fortescue, Stephen. 2016. "Russia's 'Turn to the East': A Study in Policy Making." *Post-Soviet Affairs*. Vol. 32: No. 5, pp. 423-454. (Gelman)

Final Paper Due, Monday, May 7, by 6p to me in Elliott School 303 (not emailed).

Appendix One: Suggestions and Tips on Writing

(Adapted from Material by Dr. Joanna Spear)

Sources

Please use a mix of sources for your paper: books, articles, original documents (where available) and online sources. You should always approach sources as a critical reader. Make your own judgment about the credibility of what they say and critically evaluate the sources they use and whether the empirical evidence justifies the conclusions that they reach. Also, please *do not* use Wikipedia as a source; it lacks key academic features such as clear authorship, stable text, etc. Internet sources can be suspect (anyone can put materials up on the web) so please approach these cautiously.

Sources should be cited in parenthetical notation with a "Works Cited" bibliography at the end. The proper style for footnotes or endnotes and bibliography is indicated in *The Chicago Manual of Style* and Kate L. Turabian, *Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*.

You should use at least 10 sources for your Midterm Paper and at least 20 sources for your Final Paper.

Focus Your Paper

A common structural problem with student papers is that they lack sufficient focus. There are some easy ways to avoid this problem. The first and best is to give yourself a *very specific question* (this is surprisingly hard to do well) and then structure your paper to address it.

Worst Approach. The worst case is a paper where you do not have a research question. Thus, it may have a general title like "The Ukrainian Crisis" and it may contain a lot of facts, but it includes no clear analytical structure. There will be no explanation of why the facts matter and no explanation for why events transpired as they did rather than some other way. In short, the paper will be an unstructured discursive wander around the issues. You may show some research skills in answering in this fashion, but you will not necessarily show any structuring or analytical skills. These are essential in both academic and policy writing.

Better approach. Where you have a research question, but it allows you to give a narrative answer only. For example, "What roles could NATO have played in the Ukrainian crisis?" This at least suggests a structure for the paper and could be used to establish some categories (for example, political role, military role, peacemaking role, reconstruction role). While answering this, you would certainly display some research skills, but not the analytical skills that bring you closer to a grade of 'A.'

Best approach: The question is focused and forces you to make judgments about causality and event significance. For example, "Why did NATO have limited involvement in the Ukrainian crisis?" This type of a research question will have a number of contending answers, so you really have to think about what you include, how you approach it, what you argue and how persuasive that argument is. This type of question also encourages a more sophisticated structure than merely a narrative. Thus, in answering this, your paper could be structured to summarize the event, explain its significance, and make your own

critical analysis and interpretation. You would use course material, your own research, and your own judgment to justify your conclusions about what really mattered.

Showcase Your Skills

The best papers showcase the following skills:

- Your understanding of the course materials (not just your original research)
- Your ability to conduct broad and deep original research
- Your ability to comprehend and use different kinds of documents (scholarly; policy-focused; primary government)
- Your ability to place your knowledge in a broader context (historical; academic discipline)
- Your ability to draw insights from interesting, creative places (from other disciplines or expertise areas; from other historical eras; or from other domains in international security)
- Your ability to make judgments about correlation and causality
- Your ability to present work in a suitable academic format, for example, to write a paper with a strong introduction and conclusion, to effectively footnote to providing an accurate “paper trail,” and an alphabetized bibliography.
- Your ability to edit your work effectively.

Twenty Basic Rules

These are derived from Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 123-128), and Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb and Joseph M. Williams, *The Craft of Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Selecting a Topic, Making an Argument and Organizing Your Work

1. Pick an important topic
2. Pick a manageable topic
3. Say something new and important
4. Concentrate on making a single set of arguments
5. Do not over-state or under-state your claims
6. Acknowledge other viewpoints and treat them with respect
7. Anticipate and pre-empt counter-arguments
8. Outline everything before writing anything
9. Start with a proper introduction and end with a proper conclusion
10. Use headings and sub-headings to provide structure and to convey your main points

Writing

1. Identify in your head – and write to – your audience
2. Get to the point
3. Stick to the point
4. Stay out of the weeds
5. Be precise
6. Be concise
7. Avoid jargon
8. Always write second and third drafts
9. Never plagiarize
10. Proofread every single word

Appendix Two: Grading Rubrics

Rubrics

Rubrics are common standards by which to judge performance. They enable you to understand what professors are looking for in your work. Rubrics also enable you to assess your own performance and decide where you might need to focus your efforts at improvement.

When completing all your written assignments and the group presentation for this course, please keep in mind these rubrics below. They are designed to help you understand what is required in your written work and presentations. They show what standards you should aim towards. I will be grading your work on the basis of these rubrics.

'A' Grade writing performance:

Context of and Purpose for Writing
Demonstrates a thorough understanding of context, audience, and purpose in keeping with the assignment and focuses all elements of the work. Shows an ability to situate work in the wider discipline. Stays on topic.
Content Development
Uses appropriate, relevant, and compelling content to illustrate mastery of the subject, conveying deep understanding, and shaping the whole work. Organizes the work appropriately and through that shows analytical rigor.
Disciplinary Conventions
Demonstrates detailed attention to and successful execution of a wide range of conventions particular to the Russian International Security discipline. Content remains specific to the writing tasks including organization, presentation, footnotes and bibliography, formatting and stylistic choices.
Sources and Evidence
Demonstrates skillful use of high-quality, credible and relevant sources to develop ideas that are appropriate for Russian International Security scholarship and the specific type of writing. Identifies causality effectively.
Control of Syntax and Mechanics
Uses graceful language that skillfully communicates meaning to readers with clarity and fluency. The paper is virtually error-free.

'B' Grade writing performance:

Context of and Purpose for Writing
Demonstrates adequate consideration of context, audience, and purpose and a clear focus on the assignment, but sometimes wanders off topic or fails to integrate arguments into the essay.

Content Development
Uses appropriate, relevant and compelling content to explore ideas within the context of the Russian International Security discipline, but misses some key arguments or literatures. Work is not optimally organized and therefore does not show much analysis.
Disciplinary Conventions
Demonstrates consistent use of important conventions of the Russian International Security discipline and to the writing tasks, including organization, footnotes and bibliography, content, presentation and stylistic choices
Sources and Evidence
Demonstrates consistent use of credible and relevant sources to support ideas that are situated within the Russian International Security discipline and the specific type of writing. Makes some mention of causality, but does not develop it sufficiently.
Control of Syntax and Mechanics
Uses straightforward language that generally conveys meaning to readers. The language in the essay or memorandum has few errors.

'C' grade performance:

Context of and Purpose for Writing
Demonstrates some awareness of context, audience, and purpose of the assignment (i.e., begins to show awareness of audience's perceptions and assumptions).
Uses appropriate and relevant content to develop and explore ideas through most of the work. Lacks sufficient focus, argument and organization. By choice of content makes some judgment about what is important. Does not move beyond narrative.
Disciplinary Conventions
Follows expectations appropriate to a specific discipline and/or writing task(s) for basic organization, footnoting and bibliography, content, and presentation.
Sources and Evidence
Demonstrates an attempt to use credible and/or relevant sources to support ideas that are appropriate for the Russian International Security discipline and the specific type of writing.
Control of Syntax and Mechanics
Uses language that generally conveys meaning to readers with clarity, although writing may include some errors. In the worst case, uses language that sometimes impedes meaning because of errors in usage.

In terms of your **Group Presentations**, you will be assessed on the basis of the following rubrics:

'A' grade oral presentation performance:

Delivery
The team's delivery captures and holds the attention of the audience. Speakers make eye contact with the audience and do not look at their notes often. Body language is appropriate and positive. The vocalizations are engaging, appropriately varied and maintain the interest of the audience.
Content and Organization
Impressive and appropriate content, condensed to the right degree (neither too short nor too long). Shows analytical rigor in organization. Arguments are supported by appropriate examples or data. The team can answer audience questions fully and well.
Interest and Audience Awareness
The team demonstrates real and consistent interest in the issues covered in the presentation. The audience's understanding and knowledge of the topic is increased by the team's presentation. Arguments are convincing and the case for the importance of the topic is effectively made.

'B' grade oral presentation performance:

Delivery
The team's performance is reasonably interesting. Team members make some eye contact with the audience, but they return to notes a lot. The vocalizations are satisfactorily varied and of the right volume.
Content and Organization
The team has a reasonably clear approach to organization of the presentation and supports arguments and points with some facts, examples and data. They can answer the research questions but without much elaboration.
Interest and Audience Awareness
Some of the team shows enthusiasm for the topic. The presentation raises audience understanding and awareness of most of the issues and points covered.

'C' grade oral presentation performance:

Delivery
Team's performance is not engaging. Little passion is exhibited. Team spends most of the time reading from notes and members make little eye contact with the audience. The vocalization is monotonous, sometimes not at the right volume and with little or no inflection. Body language is either overstated or very defensive.
Content and Organization
Attempts to lay out the purpose and subject and make some arguments. Points made are not adequately supported by appropriate evidence. Thin data or evidence.